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The literature on aid has come a long way in recent years, and as a result we now know 
much more about aid effectiveness than possibly ever before. But significant gaps in 
knowledge remain. One such gap is the effectiveness of aid in the so-called ‘fragile 
states’, countries with critically low policy and institutional performance ratings. The 
current paper addresses this void by examining possible links between aid and economic 
growth in fragile states. It finds that: (i) growth would have been 1.4 percentage points 
lower in highly fragile states in the absence of aid to them, compared to 2.5 percentage 
points in other countries; (ii) highly fragile states from a per capita income growth 
perspective can only efficiently absorb approximately one-third of the amounts of aid 
that other countries can, and; (iii) while from the same perspective most fragile states 
are under-aided, to the extent that they could efficiently absorb greater amounts of aid 
than they currently receive, many of the highly fragile states are substantially over-aided 
in this sense. The overall conclusion is that donors need to look very closely at their aid 
to the sub-set of fragile states deemed in this paper as highly fragile. 
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For many decades the research literature on the country-level impacts of aid sent mixed 
messages as to whether aid was effective in promoting economic growth. Some 
empirical studies found evidence of a positive association between aid and recipient 
country growth (Papanek 1973; Dowling and Hiemenz 1982; Gupta and Islam 1983; 
Levy 1987, 1988). Other empirical studies either failed to find any association or if they 
did, found that it was negative (Rahman 1968; Griffin 1970; Gupta 1970; Weisskopf 
1972; Voivodas 1973; Mosley 1980; Mosley et al. 1987; and Boone 1996).1 The second 
group of studies had support from non-empirical research, with many influential writers 
providing damning critiques of aid, from both left and right wing perspectives 
(Friedman 1970; Hayter 1971; Hensman 1971; Bauer 1981, 1991; and Hancock 1989, 
among many other writers). The lack of a consensus regarding the country-level impact 
of aid combined with strong evidence that aid projects were in general effective in 
attaining their intended outcomes, was described as the ‘micro-macro paradox’ of aid 
(Mosley 1986). This paradox was widely accepted in the aid policy and research circles. 
The late 1990s saw a fundamental change in the literature on aid and growth. 
Commencing with the publication of the seminal and extremely influential study by 
Burnside and Dollar (1997), a new stream of empirical studies emerged that provides a 
reasonably clear, unambiguous message that growth would on average be lower in the 
absence of aid. This has proved to be an especially robust research finding drawn by the 
clear majority of an increasingly large number of empirical studies of aid and growth 
conducted since Burnside and Dollar (1997). The consistency of this finding across 
studies is evident from a number of aid-growth literature surveys (Hansen and Tarp 
2000; Morrissey 2001; Beynon 2002; McGillivray 2003; Clemens, Radelet and 
Bhavnani 2004; Addison, Mavrotas and McGillivray 2005; McGillivray et al. 2006). 
The macro-micro paradox of aid would appear to be dead and buried, therefore. 
The macro-micro paradox’s demise does not imply that there are no remaining 
controversies or gaps in knowledge regarding aid effectiveness within research circles 
that aid works in all countries and at all levels.2 A repeated finding of the recent aid-
growth literature is that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between aid and 
growth. It is not beyond the bounds of imagination to infer that the levels of inflows to 
some countries are such that aid might have actually reduced growth within them. A 
disputed finding in the literature, which to date remains unsettled, is that the impact of 
aid on growth is contingent on the policy regimes of recipient countries. Burnside and 
Dollar (1997, 2000, 2004); Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) and Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) are among the studies that find that policies do matter, while Hansen and Tarp 
(2001); Hudson and Mosley (2001); Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) and Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman (2004)  are among those that find otherwise.  
                                                 
1   A number of the studies just cited do not look directly at growth but instead at either investment or 
savings within a Harrod-Domar framework. Increases in either investment or savings necessarily 
translate into growth in this framework. 
2  Nor should it be overlooked that there are those who either flatly reject or question the view that 
growth would be lower in the absence of aid. See, for example, Brumm (2003); Easterly (2003); 
Ovaska (2003) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005).  
2 
The donor community seems to side with the first group of above-mentioned studies, to 
the extent that it expresses grave concerns regarding the extent to which aid can 
promote growth, and in turn reduce income poverty, in countries it classifies as ‘fragile 
states’. These states are diverse in many respects. Some are engaged in, on the verge of, 
or have recently emerged from a civil war. Others have histories of military coups or are 
governed by corrupt, inept or oppressive regimes. Others are small states with limited 
resource endowments, or those that suffer from droughts and other natural hazards. In 
addition they tend to be especially income poor, with most belonging to the low-income 
country group. But, compared with other aid-receiving countries, all are thought to use 
aid poorly and to have lower capacities to absorb aid efficiently due to having especially 
bad policies and especially poorly performing institutions or both, as measured by the 
well-known World Bank country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) measure.3 
Donors insist that unless aid can be made to work better in these countries, worldwide 
achievement of the much espoused Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will not be 
possible in the foreseeable future, let alone by the agreed target of 2015.4  
The analytics of the donor view can be interpreted in various ways. But a consistent 
interpretation is that while the quality of policies and institutional performance are in 
general important for aid effectiveness, they are additionally important in countries with 
critically low CPIA scores. Alternative interpretations are that the quality of policies and 
institutional performance matter only at critically low CPIA scores, or that it is only 
fragility per se that matters. Each of these views is consistent with the hypothesis that 
aid effectiveness behavioural relationships are different in fragile states: a given amount 
of aid to or interaction between aid and policies in a fragile state yields less growth (and, 
by implication, poverty reduction) than in a non-fragile one. Yet this view has not been 
examined in the now rather large aid-growth and related literatures.5 This is not to 
imply that it is wrong or without foundation, just that it is yet to be put to formal, 
systematic country-wide empirical scrutiny.  
Such is the primary focus of this paper. It consists of four more sections. Section 2 
outlines an aid-growth econometric model, which is essentially an augmentation of that 
originally used by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000). Fragility is factored in to this 
model and donor views regarding aid effectiveness in fragile states are presented 
formally. Section 3 discusses econometric and data issues. Results are provided in 
                                                 
3  It is evident from this discussion that the term ‘fragile state’, as used in the donor community, might 
be misleading, to the extent that it is not used to delineate states only in terms of their likelihood of 
breaking-up or vulnerability to downside shocks.  
4  According to one of the two classification criteria currently used by the donor community, 46 
countries were classified as fragile states in 2004. Roughly one-third of the world’s population that 
live in extreme income poverty, some 340 million people, reside in these states. Of the estimated 10.8 
million children in 2002 who died before their fifth birthday, just over 40 per cent lived in these 46 
states (Branchflower et al. 2004). 
5  Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000, 2004) conclude that aid does not work in countries with bad 
policies. To the extent that these countries are at the bottom end of the Burnside and Dollar policy 
index will include some fragile states, one might be able to infer from their results that aid works less 
well or not at all in these states. But Burnside and Dollar, Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) and the 
other studies that look at the importance of policy for aid effectiveness do not look directly at fragile 
states nor look for changes in the above-mentioned behavioural relationships. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) look at aid and growth in post-conflict countries, but not all post-conflict countries are 
classified as fragile and vice versa.   
3 
Section 4 and conclusions outlined in section 5. Among the main results emerging from 
this paper is that although aid is associated with growth in fragile states, it is associated 
with much higher growth in non-fragile ones. The former also have much smaller aid 
absorptive capacities than their non-fragile counterparts. These results, however, are 
based on a sub-set of the states classified as fragile by the donor community. That sub-
set consists of countries that might be termed as highly fragile, as they have been 
selected using a lower threshold than currently adopted by the donor community. 
2 Aid-growth  empirics 
The empirical literature on links between aid and growth and related variables has in 
recent years been dominated by the analysis of panel data using what might be termed 
as a Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) type economic model. A defining feature of this 
model is that it contains one or more multiplicative terms. These terms are constructed 
by interacting aid with key variables, on which the impact of aid is thought to be 
contingent. Such an approach is clearly no panacea.6 It is however of considerable 
appeal to the analysis of aid and growth in fragile states due to the realities of 
developing country empirical data.7 The stating point to the current analysis is, 
therefore, what can be termed as a Burnside and Dollar type aid-growth model, 
augmented with fragility variables. Two versions of the model are posited, based on the 
interpretations of the donor view of aid effectiveness in fragile states outlined above. 
These versions can be written as follows: 
() ( )
2/ /
01 2 3 4 5 6 ii i i i i i i i i i ga a a p a p f =β +β +β +β • +β • • +β Φ +β Π +μ  and  (1) 
() ()
2 2/ /
01 2 3 4 5 6 ii i i i i i i i i ga a a f a f =δ +δ +δ +δ • +δ • +δΦ +δΠ +ε  (2) 
where gi is per capita GDP growth in recipient country i, ai is aid to that country, pi is an 
assessment of i’s policies and institutional performance, fi is an indicator of whether or 
not i  is classified by the donor as a fragile state, Φi is a vector of additional aid 
interaction terms, Πi is vector of control variables relating to growth in i, μi and εi are 
residuals,  β0 and δ0 are constants, β1 through to β5 and δ1 through to δ5  are slope 
coefficients and i = 1, …, n. All variables are for period t. The elements of Φi are the 
products of aid and other variables. They are constructed in the same way as the 
interactions attached to β3, β4, δ3 and δ4 in (1) and (2). As already mentioned, a common 
finding in the literature is that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between aid and 
growth, due primarily to recipient country absorptive capacity constraints. Given the 
considerable empirical support for this view it is expected that β1 > 0, δ1 > 0, β2 < 0 and 
                                                 
6  It has also had its critics and is subject to some widely accepted limitations such as treating aid from 
different donors as analytically equivalent and not being able to take into account changes in the 
composition of aid over time. There are of course the ever-present concerns over the reliability of the 
data used. Roodman (2004) provides an incisive methodological critique of a number of recent 
studies, and warns of the limits of panel data analyses of aid and growth.  
7  Other approaches might include the analysis of fragile state-specific timeseries data or a panel only 
containing data for fragile states. Data availability rules out these approaches. Analysis of timeseries 
data is in particular ruled out given the extreme difficulty of obtaining long-run relationships.  
4 
δ2 < 0. Aid is assumed to be less effective in fragile states, following the views of the 
donor community. It is therefore expected that β4 < 0, δ3 < 0 and δ4 < 0. 








   (3) 
where p* and y* are CPIA and per capita income thresholds, respectively, used by the 
donor community to classify a country as a fragile state in any given period t.  
Given equations (3), it follows that (1) and (2) can be written, respectively, as follows 
() ( ) ii i i i i i i ga a a p = β +β +β + β +β •+ β Φ+ β Π+ μ
2/ /
01 2 34 5 6 and (1a) 
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2/ /
01 3 2 4 5 6 ii i i i i ga a  (2a) 
for the i = 1, …, k countries for which fi = 1 and reduce to 
() ii i i i i i i ga a a p = β +β +β +β •+ β Φ+ β Π+ μ
2/ /
01 2 3 5 6  and  (1b) 
=δ +δ +δ +δΦ +δΠ +ε
2/ /
01 2 5 6 ii i i i i ga a  (2b) 
for the i = k+1, …, n countries for which fi = 0.  
The incremental rates of growth in fragile and non-fragile states due to aid, according 
(1a) and (1b), are:  
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respectively. From (2a) and (2b) the equivalent incremental rates of growth are:  
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respectively.  
5 
The levels of aid that maximize per capita GDP growth according to (1) and (2) occur 








































*  (6b) 
respectively. These levels are interpreted as an indicator of the capacity to efficiently 
absorb aid. 





*. These are the donor views, formally depicted, regarding the effectiveness of aid 
and absorptive capacity constraints in fragile states relative to their aid-receiving non-
fragile counterparts. An empirical evaluation of these views is conducted later in this 
paper by estimating equations (1) and (2) and conducting standard hypothesis tests. 
Also conducted is an evaluation of the appropriateness of the donor community’s 
chosen policy threshold, p
*. 
3  Data, preliminary tests and econometric method 
The parameters of equation (1) were estimated using 1977 to 2001 aggregate aid 
receipts to a diverse sample of 113 countries. This period was chosen purely on the 
basis of data availability. The measure of aid used is net disbursements of official 
development assistance (ODA), expressed as a ratio of recipient country GDP.8 The 
measure of policy and institutional performance employed is the CPIA. There appears to 
be a high degree of uniformity in the post Burnside and Dollar (1997) literature 
regarding the likely determinants of growth other than aid. Recent studies are followed 
in selecting elements of the control variable vector, Πi. The following variables were 
selected, all for recipient i: (i) policy stance; (ii) initial GDP per capita; (iii) initial 
population; (iv) ethno-linguistic fractionalization; (v) assassinations; (vi) money supply; 
                                                 
8  Given some of the estimates reported below it is instructive to note that: (i) aid relative to GDP to the 
countries in the above sample has remained reasonably stable over time (averaging 8, 9 and 10 per 
cent over the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, respectively); and (ii) that it is not uncommon in this sample for 
countries to receive aid that is more than 40 per cent of GDP.  
6 
(vii) the interaction of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and assassinations; 
(viii) institutional quality; (ix) fraction of land area that is tropical, (x) a binary variable 
taking the value of one for all Sub-Saharan African countries and zero for all others, and 
(xi) a binary variable taking the value of one for all East Asian countries and zero for all 
others. The time-variant data are expressed as four year averages, as has become the 
convention in the aid-growth literature. Such a treatment reduces the likelihood of 
outliers. Further details of the aid variable and all other variables finally used in the 
econometric analysis are given in Appendix Table A1. 
The international donor community currently uses two fragile state classifications. The 
first deems a country fragile if it belongs to bottom two quintiles of CPIA scores or has 
not been rated in the current CPIA exercise. The income threshold (y*) for this 
classification is implicit and non-operative, being at a level to deem a country eligible to 
receive aid per se. The second deems a country fragile if it is a low-income country that 
has a CPIA score of 3.0 or less (Branchflower et al. 2004).9 Values of p* and y* 
consistent with these classifications were used to construct two fragile state variables 
using the procedure outlined in equation (3) above. Thirty-four of the countries in the 
overall sample of 113 countries were fragile according to these definitions. The above 
threshold values were initially used in the regression analysis, although alternative 
fragile state classifications, based on different values of p*, were also used. Further 
details are given in Appendix Table A1. 
A number of aid interaction terms like those in equations (1) and (2) have been popular 
in the aid-growth literature, subsequent to Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000). That study 
interacted aid and a measure of recipient country policy. Subsequent studies have, for 
example, interacted aid with trade shocks (Collier and Dehn 2001), economic 
vulnerability and political instability (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001; Chauvet and 
Guillaumont 2002), post-conflict and post-conflict and policy (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004), tropical area (Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp 2004) and institutional quality and 
initial income per capita (Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 2004). Most studies have 
interacted aid with one or two variables only. Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) is 
an exception to this general rule, interacting aid not only with institutional quality and 
initial income per capita but a range of other variables. The approach adopted by 
Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) was to examine the relevance of each interaction 
one at a time, in separate regressions. The interactions do not appear, therefore, 
simultaneously in a single regression equation. There appears to be a good case for 
adopting that approach, based on this paper’s preliminary testing. The above 
interactions are highly inter-correlated and highly correlated with aid and aid-squared, 
to such an extent that it is problematic econometrically to include more one interaction 
in a single regression. The upshot of this preliminary testing was that in subsequent 
estimation, for which results are reported below, the elements of β5 are restricted to 
zero.10 Subsequent estimation cautiously persists, however, with the aid-policy, aid-
fragility and aid-policy-fragility interactions since they are a prime interest of the paper. 
                                                 
9   These are also the criteria that the World Bank uses to allocate a country to the low-income country 
under stress (LICUS) group. 
10 Estimation was also conducted along the lines of that reported in Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 
(2004). This involved using ‘short impact’ aid variable instead of an aggregate aid variable such as 
total ODA. The former variable is obtained by summing those aid inflows that are thought to have the  
7 
Recent aid-growth studies use either or both of the general method of moments (GMM) 
and instrumental variables (IV) to estimate the parameters of their econometric models. 
IV had been the preferred approach of many previous aid-growth studies, owing to the 
likely endogeneity of the aid variable. GMM is the preferred approach of the current 
study on the grounds provided by Hansen and Tarp (2001). They accept that aid is likely 
to be endogenous, but also argue that any policy variables in period t are likely to be 
correlated with shocks in earlier periods, violating the assumption that all variables 
other than aid are exogenous and not therefore correlated with the error term. Such a 
correlation implies that an IV approach will yield inconsistent parameter estimates. 
GMM is not subject to this criticism as it provides estimates that are consistent in the 
presence of one or more endogenous regressors. This specific variant of GMM used in 
the current paper is a two-step system GMM proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
extended by Roodman (2005), which is thought to be more efficient than a single-step 
approach. In that system, equations are first differenced to eliminate unobserved country 
effects. The Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction to the two-step covariance 
matrix is applied. A cost of using this approach is that all time invariant variables cannot 
be used in econometric model. The choice of variables used to instrument foreign aid in 
the IV estimation largely follows Burnside and Dollar (2000); Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
and Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004).11 
4 Results 
GMM estimates of variants of equations (1) and (2) are shown in Table 1. The results 
reported in columns 1 to 4 are for various specifications of equation (1). These results 
are based on the first above-mentioned fragile states definition, which sees a country 
being classified as fragile if it is in the bottom two CPIA score quintiles or if it is not 
rated). Poor results were obtained when both the aid-policy and aid-policy-fragility 
interactions are included in the equation (see column 1). One cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the parameters attached to these interactions (β3 and β4, respectively) are 
significantly different from zero. The same applies to the parameters attached to aid and 
aid-squared (β1 and β2, respectively). Dropping the latter interaction made little 
difference, with β1,  β2 and β3 remaining statistically insignificant (see column 2). 
Dropping the former interaction also made little difference (see column 3). Dropping 
both the aid-policy and aid-policy-fragility interactions did make a difference, in that it 
did permit the replication of the result most commonly reported in the literature, with 
both β1 and β2 being significantly different from zero and being positive and negative, 
respectively. These results are shown in column 4. Broadly similar results were obtained 
                                                                                                                                               
potential to stimulate growth within a four year period. This approach proved to be unfruitful. Full 
details of this and all other preliminary testing are available from the authors.  
11 These variables include a country dummy for Egypt, a region dummy for Central America, a Franc 
zone dummy, arms imports to total imports lagged once, the interaction of the CPIA and arms 
imports, the interaction of initial GDP and the CPIA, the interaction of initial population and the CPIA 
and aid, aid squared and the aid fragility interaction term all lagged once. All IV estimations pass the 
Hansen J-test for over-identifying restrictions and the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio 
test for instrument relevance.   
 
Table 1 
GMM estimates of aid-growth-fragility relationships 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13 














































































Aid-policy (ai•pi) (β3)  0.121
(1.53) 
0.106
(1.25)  – – – – – – – – – – – 
Aid-policy-fragility (ai•pi•fi) (β4)  0.007
(0.60)  –  0.012
(0.50)  – – – – – – – – – – 


















Aid-fragility-squared ((ai•fi)2) (δ4)   – – – –  -0.001
(0.56)  –  0.000
(0.10)  –  0.001
(0.28)  –  -0.009
(1.14)  – – 








































































































Observations (n)  637 637 637 637 637 637 637 637 637 637 637 637 637 
Number of countries  113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 




from the IV results, shown below in columns 1 to 4 of Appendix Table A2.12 These and 
all other IV results reported below should, however, be seen as indicative, given the 
comments made above about this method of estimation. On the basis of all of the results 
obtained from estimating (1) and its variants, and many others not reported in Tables 1 
and A2, no evidence is found in support of the view that that while the quality of 
policies and institutional performance are in general important for aid effectiveness, 
they are additionally important in countries with critically low CPIA scores. Nor was 
any evidence found in support of the view that only the quality of policies and 
institutional performance below particular threshold matters for aid effectiveness.13 
Estimates of various specifications of equation (2) are shown in columns 5 to 12 of 
Table 1. These estimates allow one to test the view that it is only fragility per se which 
matters. According to this view it is not a country’s CPIA score that matters for aid 
effectiveness, only whether this score falls below a critical threshold. The key 
parameters for testing this view are δ3 and δ4. Columns 5 and 6 report results obtained 
using the first above-mentioned fragile states classification (a country with a CPIA 
score in the bottom two quintiles or that has not been rated), while columns 7 and 8 
report results obtained from the second above-mentioned classification (a low-income 
country with a CPIA score of less than or equal to 3.0). The results in columns 9 and 10 
are obtained after deeming a country fragile if it is a low-income country with a CPIA 
of less than 2.0. Rather poor results were obtained, all of the coefficients attached to the 
aid-fragility interactions (δ3 and δ4) and most of those attached the non-interacted aid 
variables (δ1 and δ2) being insignificantly different from zero. Although not reported in 
Table A2, the results obtained from IV estimation were in general in conformity with 
the results shown in columns 5 to 10 of Table 1. 
The results reported in columns 11 to 12 of Table 1 have been obtained by setting the 
threshold p* such that a country is fragile if it belongs to the bottom CPIA quintile. 
Such a country can be considered to be highly fragile. Much better results are obtained. 
In particular, they are consistent with the consensus that there is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between aid and growth given the signs attached to and significance of δ1 
and δ2. The preferred specification, of all those for which results are reported in Table 1, 
is that for which results are shown in column 12. There is some support for these results 
given the IV results shown in column 4 of Table A2. Combined with the results reported 
above, these results tell us that one can only observe differences in aid effectiveness 
between fragile and non-fragile states if one uses a lower CPIA threshold than those 
used by the donor community. Put differently, the difference is between the highly 
fragile states and all others and not between fragile states per se and all others.  
Two other sets of results are worth mentioning. The first is the estimates of the 
parameter attached to the policies and institutions variable, the CPIA. This parameter is 
positive and significant in all specifications, both GMM and IV. While there is little 
evidence from this paper’s econometric work that the quality of policies and institutional 
                                                 
12 The IV regressions contain both the CPIA and the institutional quality variable. The correlation 
coefficient between these variables is low, indicating that they seem to be measuring different 
characteristics and that multicollinearity between them is not problematic. 
13 These conclusions still hold if the second classification mentioned above (a low-income country with 
a CPIA score of less than or equal to 3.0) or lower CPIA thresholds to classify a country as fragile. 
Further details are available from the authors.  
10 
performance matter at all levels for aid effectiveness, it is apparent that they certainly do 
matter at all levels for growth. The second set of results worthy of mention are those 
reported in column 13 of Table 1. A country can remain in the bottom or bottom two 
CPIA quintiles even if its CPIA score increases over time. This reflects the very essence 
of a quintile, which is based on rankings of the variable under question rather than its 
values. One wonders whether this is appropriate in the context of fragile states, as it 
involves a relative CPIA threshold rather than an absolute one that is invariant with 
respect to time.14 In particular, one can question whether the estimates reported in column 
12 are robust with respect to using a threshold that is fixed over time. The results reported 
in column 13 of Table 1 shed some light on this issue. They are based on a CPIA 
threshold fixed at 2.2 over the time period under question. This value equates to average 
CPIA values that a country must achieve to avoid being placed in the bottom CPIA 
quintiles over this time period. Using this threshold makes no effective difference, given 
the results shown in column 12 and the purposes of this paper. 
Growth rates due to aid (gi
af and gi
anf) the growth efficient aid levels (ai
*f and ai
*nf) 
consistent with the preferred GMM specification are shown in Table 2. The growth rates 
have been obtained using equations (4a) and (4b) and the growth efficient aid levels 
using (6a) and (6b), albeit with δ4 set to zero. To be clear, the non-highly fragile states 
group includes many countries classified as fragile by the donor community. In 
particular, it includes all countries in the second CPIA quintile in the years under 
consideration. As is shown, aid has contributed to 1.37 percentage points to growth in 
highly fragile states, those in the bottom CPIA quintile, compared to 2.47 percentage 
points in all other countries. The difference is 1.1 percentage points in favour of the 
non-highly fragile countries. The level of aid that maximizes per capita GDP growth in 
non-highly fragile states corresponds to 38.38 per cent of GDP. This is roughly three 
times the corresponding amount in highly fragile countries, levels of aid relative to GDP 
in the highly fragile states, which is 13.88 per cent. 
The results reported in Table 2 provide important information for the donor community. 
Donors are currently scaling up their aid programmes. Total ODA flows from OECD 
Development Assistance Committee Members increased from US$69 billion in 2003 to 
US$106 billion in 2005 (OECD 2005a, 2006). There is pressure to increase aid flows 
even further, given widespread calls to increase ODA to US$135 billion per year to help 
achieve the MDGs (UN Millennium Project Report 2005). It is vitally important that in 
such an environment donors avoid providing more aid to recipients than these can 
efficiently absorb. If donors are concerned about the impact of aid on growth (and they 
are, given especially the implications for poverty reduction), they should in general 
avoid over-aiding countries by providing allocations greater than the growth efficient 
levels. This is justified on the grounds that aid is in principle about poverty reduction, 
and that growth is an important way of achieving this. Given the information in Table 2, 
this would see donors providing aid levels that do not exceed 13.88 per cent of highly 
fragile state GDP and 38.38 per cent of the GDPs of all other countries.  
 
 
                                                 
14 A case for using a relative threshold is that CPIA scores are subjectively determined by a group whose 
membership changes over time.  
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Table 2 
Estimates of key statistics  
Statistic  Estimate 
Growth due to aid (%) 
  (Highly) fragile states   (giaf)  
   
1.37 
  All other countries   (gianf)   2.47 
Growth efficient aid levels (% of GDP) 
  (Highly) fragile states   (ai*f) 
 
13.88 
  All other countries   (ai*nf)  38.38 
 
Actual and growth efficient allocations are compared in Table 3. Some further remarks 
are warranted prior to examining these comparisons. The growth efficient aid levels 
shown in Table 2 should been seen as a rough allocation decision rule-of-thumb for 
donors. Allocations in excess of the growth efficient level for certain recipients in the all 
other country group could perhaps be easily justified, given the diversity of countries 
within it. But such a case would presumably be more difficult to support for the highly 
fragile states group. Aid in excess of the growth efficient level would need to be 
examined very carefully by the donor or donors in question using recipient country 
specific information. For example, some donors might want to allocate more aid than 
the growth efficient level to a country to prevent it sliding back into conflict. 
Alternatively, donors might provide large amounts of humanitarian aid to deal with a 
food shortage or distribution crisis. In both cases growth is not the immediate objective 
of donors, instead they might be more concerned with establishing the pre-conditions 
for growth. Aid should be cut back to the growth efficient level if a case such as this 
cannot be made. The decision rule should not however be ignored where such a case can 
be made, as it shows the potential opportunity cost, in terms of growth forgone, of such 
a strategy. One might even interpret aid provided in excess of the decision rule over a 
given number of years to be the sign of a failing aid programme.  
It should also be emphasized that the growth efficient decision rule does not necessarily 
tell donors how they should be allocating aid among the countries they support. Nor 
does it necessarily advocate allocating additional aid to countries receiving less than the 
growth efficient amount. A growth efficient inter-recipient aid allocation is one that 
equalizes the marginal impact of aid across all recipients. This impact is zero at the 
growth efficient level. A donor’s budget might be sufficiently large to allow for the 
growth efficient level to be provided to all countries. In the absence of such a budget the 
optimal allocation is one that gives each country less than the growth efficient 
amount.15 The decision rule outlined above is thus a partial rule, simply providing an 
upper limit to the amounts of aid that donors should provide to each recipient if poverty 
reduction via income growth is their sole objective. It does, however, provide an 
additional implicit rule of thumb. If donors are unable to equalize the marginal growth 
impact of aid among the countries they support, they should re-allocate aid from 
                                                 
15 The growth efficient amount is in effect the optimal solution derived from an unconstrained 
maximization problem in which the rate of growth is the only variable in the objective function.  
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countries that are over-aided to those that are the most under-aided relative to the 
growth efficient amount so that no countries receive more than this amount.16 
Let us now examine Table 3 in light of these comments. The countries listed in Table 3 
belong to the bottom two 2004 CPIA quintiles or those that were not rated in the 2004 
CPIA exercise, for which requisite data are available. The list was obtained from World 
Bank (2004). The actual aid allocations shown in Table 3 are net disbursements of ODA 
in 2004, obtained from OECD (2005b). Obtained from World Bank (2004), the most 
recent GDP data available are for the year 2002.17 
Ten of the countries listed in Table 3 are over-aided relative to the growth efficient 
amount. The two most over-aided countries are the Solomon Islands and Burundi. 
Expressed as percentages of GDP, actual aid levels to these countries are close to four 
times the growth efficient levels. The contribution of aid to growth falls to zero when 
aid reaches twice the growth efficient level and is negative for any amounts above this 
threshold.18 Given that aid to the Solomon Islands and Burundi in 2004 was more than 
twice that level, it follows that if we accept the estimates reported above aid actually 
contributed to negative growth in that year. There may be good reasons why aid levels 
in 2004 were of the amounts indicated in Table 3. Both are post-conflict countries, for 
instance. But they do seem to have had a very high opportunity cost in terms of growth 
forgone. Moreover, keeping aid at such levels for any prolonged period of time would 
appear to be hard to sustain on growth efficiency grounds. Similar comments apply to a 
number of the other over-aided highly fragile (bottom quintile) countries. These 
countries are Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Timor Leste, each of which receives 
close to twice the growth efficient level of aid. The donors that support these countries, 
along with those supporting the Solomon Islands and Burundi, need to look very closely 
at their aid levels to them if current or intended future levels resemble those provided in 
2004. 
Of the 22 countries listed in Table 3 that received less aid in 2004 than the growth 
efficient level, Uzbekistan, the Republic of Congo and Guinea appear to have been the 
most under-aided relative to their absorptive capacities. All but two of the fourth 
quintile countries have received less aid than the growth efficient level, and most of 
these countries could have efficiently absorbed more than an additional 20 per cent of 
their GDPs as aid. These countries have ability to efficiently absorb much larger 
amounts of aid than they received in 2004, therefore. 
 
                                                 
16 Country specific information could also be factored into this decision, in the same way it could be 
used to justify over-aiding. For instance, Zimbabwe is shown below to be under-aided. Given current 
political conditions in that country it would appear to be difficult to make a case for providing it with 
additional official aid, especially through traditional channels. 
17 It follows that the growth efficient aid for countries experiencing positive GDP growth in 2003 and 
2004 will be (slightly) under-estimated. The reverse applies to countries that have experienced 
negative growth. These caveats need to be kept in mind when examining the data in Table 3. 
18 According to equation (2a), the incremental impact of aid on growth falls to zero at 
 –(δ1+δ2)/(δ2+δ4). On comparison with equation (6a) it is clear this impact falls to zero at twice the 
growth efficient amount.  
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Table 3 
Actual and growth efficient aid, fragile states, 2004 
  Actual aid  Growth efficient aid   
Growth efficient 
 minus actual aid 
  % GDP  US$  % GDP  US$    % GDP  US$  %(a 
Fifth quintile(b                
Angola 10.17  1144.1  13.88 1561.3  3.71 417.22  36 
Burundi 48.77  350.68  13.88  99.80 -34.89  -250.9  -72 
Central African Rep.  9.99  104.54 13.88 145.17  3.89 40.635  39 
Comoros 9.58  24.51  13.88 35.52  4.30  11.006 45 
Congo Dem. Rep  31.80  1815  13.88 792.13  -17.92  -1023  -56 
Cote d'Ivoire  1.31  153.56 13.88  1621.51  12.57  1467.9  956 
Eritrea 40.40  259.52  13.88  89.17 -26.52  -170.4  -66 
Guinea-Bissau 37.49  76.23  13.88  28.23  -23.61 -48  -63 
Haiti 7.06  242.7  13.88  476.81 6.82  234.11  96 
Laos 16.05  269.6  13.88  233.15 -2.17  -36.45  -14 
Liberia 37.47  210.48  13.88  77.98 -23.59  -132.5  -63 
Nigeria 1.32  573.4  13.88 6043.38  12.56 5470  954 
Solomon Islands  51.01  122.19  13.88 33.25 -37.13 -88.94  -73 
Sudan 6.53  882.27  13.88 1876.07  7.35 993.8  113 
Timor Leste  39.37  152.75  13.88 53.85 -25.49  -98.9  -65 
Togo 4.44  61.39  13.88  192.03 9.44  130.64  213 
Zimbabwe 2.25  186.49  13.88 1152.66  11.63 966.17  518 
Fourth quintile             
Cambodia 11.94  478.27  38.38 1537.04  26.44 1058.8  221 
Chad 15.93  318.91  38.38  768.34 22.45  449.43  141 
Congo. Rep.  3.84  115.97  38.38 1158.02  34.54 1042.1  899 
Djibouti 10.75  64.13  38.38  228.97 27.63  164.84  257 
Gambia 17.62  62.84  38.38  136.87 20.76  74.032  118 
Guinea 8.69  279.25  38.38 1233.18  29.69 953.93  342 
Kiribati 31.32  16.71  38.38 20.48  7.06 3.7697  23 
Mauritania 18.56  179.8  38.38 371.84  19.82  192.04  107 
Papua New Guinea  9.46  266.27 38.38  1080.16  28.92  813.89  306 
Sao Tomé & Principe  66.53  33.42 38.38  19.28  -28.15 -14.14  -42 
Sierra Leone  45.94  359.65  38.38 300.47  -7.56  -59.18  -16 
Tajikistan 19.87  240.85  38.38 465.11  18.51  224.26  93 
Tonga 14.16  19.26  38.38  52.21 24.22  32.945  171 
Uzbekistan 3.10  245.53  38.38 3044.48  35.28 2799  1140 
Vanuatu 16.11  37.77  38.38 89.97  22.27  52.201  138 
Note:  a  of actual aid. b or in the cases of Liberia and Timor Leste, countries not rated in the 2004 CPIA 
exercise. Dollar amounts are in millions. 
5 Conclusion 
A consensus has emerged over recent years regarding the effectiveness of aid. Aid in 
general appears to work, to the extent that economic growth would have been lower in 
its absence. Yet lingering doubts remain, particularly among official donor agencies 
over its impact in so-called fragile states: those countries with critically low policy and 
institutional performance ratings. The empirical aid-growth literature has been silent on 
this issue to the extent that it has not been addressed directly. This paper examined 
possible links between aid and economic growth in fragile states, thus attempting to  
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offset the above-mentioned void, employing panel data econometrics. The period under 
consideration was 1977 to 2001.  
It was found that there is no observable difference between the impact of aid in 
countries the international community deems as fragile and other aid-receiving 
countries. A difference does emerge, however, if a lower policy and institutional 
performance threshold is used to classify a state as fragile. Aid is associated with higher 
growth in these highly fragile states, those in the bottom CPIA quintile, but much less 
so than in other countries. Decreasing and negative returns between aid and growth are 
also predicted in these highly fragile states at much lower levels of aid than in other 
countries. They can only efficiently absorb roughly one-third the amount of aid that 
non-highly fragile states can: 13.88 as compared to 38.38 per cent of GDP. According 
to the evidence presented in this paper, providing aid in excess of these amounts will 
reduce aid effectiveness by decreasing its incremental impact on per capita GDP 
growth. If aid levels are more than twice this amount, its contribution to per capita 
income growth and per capita incomes levels is negative.  
An examination of aggregate ODA allocations to 32 states deemed as fragile by the 
donor community in 2004 found that most were under-aided relative to their capacities 
to efficiently convert aid into economic growth. This is an important policy issue, given 
recent proposals and pledges to substantially increase aid flows. Most of these countries 
can absorb far more aid than they received in 2004 and growth in them will be higher as 
a result of such increases, provided the increases do not take aid above 13.88 per cent of 
GDP in countries in the bottom 2004 CPIA quintile and 38.38 per cent GDP in those in 
the second bottom quintile. Ten of the 32 states are over-aided, in that their 2004 
receipts exceeded their absorptive capacities. Most of these countries are highly fragile, 
in the bottom 2004 quintile. The two most over-aided countries were the Solomon 
Islands and Burundi, both of whom received in 2004 more than twice the amounts they 
can efficiently absorb, at which the incremental impact of aid on growth is maximized. 
As such there is reason to believe that the incremental impact of aid on growth in the 
Solomon Island and Burundi was negative in 2004, leading one to speculate that aid 
might have actually increased the number of people living in poverty in these countries 
in that year. Other substantially over-aided countries in 2004 were Eritrea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia and Timor Leste. While there might be valid, recipient country-specific 
reasons for providing more aid to these countries than they can efficiently absorb from a 
growth perspective, it is clear that the opportunity cost of such allocations is high in 
terms of growth and most probably poverty reduction forgone. 
This findings reported in this paper have a number of implications for donors. Donors 
should be particularly concerned with the very fragile states, those in the bottom CPIA 
quintile. Donors should also be concerned with aid and growth relationships in states in 
the second-bottom quintile, but no more than in countries in the higher quintiles. The 
concern for the bottom quintile countries is of course a concern for the quality of 
recipient country policy regimes and the performance of their institutions. What appears 
to matter for aid effectiveness, given the findings of this paper, is that policies and 
institutions in recipient countries are such that they do not fall below a certain CPIA 
threshold. That threshold is the score that assigns a country to the bottom CPIA quintile. 
How far above this threshold a country might be appears to make no difference to aid 
effectiveness: all that matters is that it does not fall below it. Donors should also be 
concerned about policies and institutions in recipient countries, as this paper found that 
they are important for growth, independently of aid. Efforts aimed at increasing this by  
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improving policies and institutional performance have a double edged sword, therefore, 
and should be prioritized by the donor community. Finally, the donor community 
urgently needs to examine the amounts of ODA it provides to countries that this found 
to be over-aided, the Solomon Islands and Burundi in particular, if current or intended 
future levels resemble those provided in 2004. Unless compelling justifications, not 
directly related to growth, can be found for such allocations, donors either need to cut 
back aid to these countries or work very quickly to increase their absorptive capacities. 
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Appendix Table A1 
Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Data  Source  Notes 
Per-capita GDP growth   World Bank (2003)     
Initial GDP per capita   Summers and Heston 
(1991), updated using 
World Bank (2003)  
Natural logarithm of GDP/capita for first 
year of period; constant 1985 dollars . 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, 1960  
Roeder (2001)   Probability that two individuals will belong 
to different ethnic groups.  
Assassinations  Banks (2002)   Assassinations, per capita  
Institutional quality   PRS Group’s IRIS III 
dataset (Knack and Keefer 
1995)  
Revised version of variable. Computed as 
the average of the three components still 
reported after 1997.  
Country policy and 
institutional assessment 
ratings (CPIA) 
World Bank   
Sub-Saharan Africa   World Bank (2003)   Dummy variable taking the value of one if 
the nation is located in sub-Saharan Africa 
or zero if otherwise.  
East Asia      Dummy variable taking the value of one 
for China, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand or 
zero if otherwise. 
Net overseas development 
assistance disbursements,  
as a ratio of nominal GDP  
OECD (2002), World Bank 
(2003)  
 
Tropical area fraction   Gallup and Sachs (1999)     
Population   World Bank (2003)   Mid-year estimate, natural logarithm.  
Money supply  World Bank (2003)  M2 - money and quasi money, comprising 
the sum of currency outside banks, 
demand deposits other than those of the 
central government, and the time, 
savings, and foreign currency deposits of 
resident sectors other than the central 
government. 
Fragile state dummy 1  World Bank  A country is classified as fragile if its 
average CPIA rating during the period 
falls into the bottom two quintiles. 
Fragile state dummy 2  World Bank  A country is classified as fragile if its 
average CPIA rating during the period 
falls into the bottom quintile. 
Fragile state dummy 3  World Bank  A country is classified as fragile if it is a 
low-income country (for any year in the 
period) and has an average CPIA score of 
3 or below. 
Fragile state dummy 4  World Bank  A country is classified as fragile if it is a 
low-income country (for any year in the 
period) and has an average CPIA score of 
less than 2.  
Fragile state dummy 5  World Bank  A country is classified as fragile if its 
average CPIA rating during the period is 




Appendix Table A2 
IV estimation of aid-growth-fragility relationships 
 1  2  3  4  5 































Aid-policy (ai ￿ pi)   (β3)  -0.148 
(0.97) 
-0.005 
(0.07)  - -  - 
Aid-policy-fragility (ai ￿ pi ￿ fi)   (β4)  -0.228 
(1.54)  -  -0.225 
(1.02)  - - 
Aid-fragility (ai ￿fi)   (δ3)  -       -0.323* 
(1.79) 
Aid-fragility-squared((ai ￿ fi)
2 )   (δ4)  - -  -  -  - 




























































Ethno-linguistic   (β6,7 or δ6,7) 






















































2  0.32 0.34 0.29 0.29  0.28 
Observations (n)  442  442  442  442  442 
Notes:  Robust z statistics in parenthesis. 
* denotes significantly different from zero at 90 per cent level or greater. 
 
 